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We show that a recently proposed relativistic commitment scheme [Sci. Rep. 4, 6774 (2014).
arXiv:1406.6679] is insecure against the cheating of the committer.
Recently, a relativistic commitment scheme is proposed
[1] and claimed to be unconditionally secure. The scheme
is carried on among three parties, the committer Alice
(A), the receiver Bob (B) and his agent C. The coding
method of the scheme is as follows. Denote Bell states as
(Eq. (1) of [1])
|uiuj〉 = |0〉 |uj〉+ (−1)
ui |1〉 |1⊕ uj〉√
2
. (1)
To make a commitment, A secretly prepares N Bell pairs
|βac〉 =
⊗N
n=1 |uauc〉n and sends the second qubit of each
pair to C, while keeping the first qubit of each pair to her-
self. The values of ua and uc are chosen according to the
value she wants to commit. To commit to the bit 0, A
initiates with |βac〉 =
⊗N
n=1 |00〉n; to commit to the bit
1, A initiates with |βac〉 =
⊗N
n=1 |01〉n; to commit to
the qubit (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, A prepares |βac〉 =
⊗N
n=1 |10〉n
while for committing (|0〉−|1〉)/√2, A starts with |βac〉 =⊗N
n=1 |11〉n. Then B and C perform some operations on
their half of |βac〉 and some other qubits at their side.
In the revealing phase, A reveals her commitment by an-
nouncing the values of uauc. Also, to justify that she is
honest, she sends to B the other half of |βac〉 that she
kept.
Results
Here we show that a dishonest A can always alter her
commitment in the revealing phase by applying local op-
erations on the qubits she kept, while passing the security
checks of B and C with probability 100%.
Methods
A’s cheating strategy is simple. From Eq. (1) we can
see that the Pauli matrix σz acting on the first qubit alone
can flip the value of the bit ui, while (−1)uiσx acting on
the first qubit alone can flip the value of the bit uj , i.e.,
(σz ⊗ I) |uiuj〉 = |u¯iuj〉 ,
((−1)uiσx ⊗ I) |uiuj〉 = |uiu¯j〉 . (2)
Here I is the identity operator on the second qubit. That
is, A can change |uauc〉n among the four Bell states freely
with a local unitary transformation of her own, without
the help of B and C.
Therefore, A can always starts the commitment phase
with |βac〉 =
⊗N
n=1 |00〉n. Later, in the revealing phase,
if she wants to convince B and C that she has committed
to the bit 0, she simply follows the original scheme hon-
estly. But if she wants to show that she has committed to
the bit 1 (or the qubits (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2 or (|0〉− |1〉)/√2),
she applies σx (σz or σzσx) immediately on each of the N
qubits she kept, before sending them to B. Note that the
local operations on the two qubits of a Bell state, respec-
tively, always commute with each other. Therefore, no
matter what operations B and C had performed on their
share of the qubits, A’s above operation will make |βac〉
appear as if it was originally prepared as
⊗N
n=1 |01〉n
(
⊗N
n=1 |10〉n or
⊗N
n=1 |11〉n), without causing any con-
flict with the measurement results of B and C. Thus her
cheating can never be detected.
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